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1 Introduction
The question of how a minimum wage affects employment remains one of the most widely
studied – and most controversial – topics in labor economics, with a corresponding dispute
in the political sphere. Neoclassical economic theories present a clear prediction: as the
price of labor increases, employers will demand less labor. However, many recent studies
testing this prediction have found very small to no effects of the minimum wage on the
level of employment (e.g. Zavodny, 2000; Dube et al., 2010; Giuliano, 2013). One possible
explanation for these findings is that demand for low-wage labor is fairly inelastic; another
is that more complicated dynamics cloud identification of the effect of the minimum wage
on employment.1
We argue that there is basis in theory for believing that the minimum wage may not
reduce the level of employment in a discrete manner. We show that if this is indeed the case,
then traditional approaches used in the literature are prone to misstating its true effects. We
also demonstrate that a common practice in this literature – the inclusion of state-specific
time trends as a control – will attenuate estimates of how the minimum wage affects the
employment level. Specifically, we perform a simulation exercise which shows that if the
true effect of the minimum wage is indeed in the growth rate of new employment, then
even real causal effects on the level of employment can be attenuated to be statistically
indistinguishable from zero.
To implement our analysis, we use a number of different empirical approaches to examine
effects of the minimum wage on employment growth and levels; broadly, all of our approaches
leverage a difference-in-differences identification strategy using state panels. We perform
numerous robustness checks to test the validity of our identification strategy, which requires
that the pre-existing time-paths of outcomes for states which increase their minimum wages
do not differ relative to states that do not see an increase. We evaluate this possibility
by adding leads of the minimum wage into our specifications; if increases in the minimum
wage showed a negative effect on employment dynamics before their implementation, this
would suggest that the results are being driven by unobserved trends. This is not the case.
Indeed, for our results to be driven by confounders, one would have to believe that increases
in the minimum wage were systematically correlated with unobserved shocks to that state
in the same time period, but not other states in that region, and that these shocks are
not reflected in measures of state-specific demographics or business cycles. Our results are
1Hirsch et al. [2011] and Schmitt [2013] focus on other channels of adjustment in response to increases in
the minimum wage, such as wage compression, reductions in hours worked, and investments in training.
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additionally robust to varying the specifications to account for finer spatial and temporal
controls, the recent financial crisis, and inflation indexing of state minimum wages, as well
as across different panel lengths and time periods.
We use three administrative data sets in our analysis: the Business Dynamics Statis-
tics (BDS), the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), and the Quarterly
Workforce Indicators (QWI). These data sets vary in their strengths and weaknesses, dis-
cussed at length below, but together they encompass a long (1975-2012) panel of aggregate
employment metrics for the population of employers in the United States. Our findings are
consistent across all three data sets, indicating that employment declines significantly in
response to increases in the minimum wage over the span of several years.
Finally, we find that the effect on job growth is concentrated in lower-wage industries,
among younger workers, and among those with lower levels of education. Much of the
existing literature focuses on these groups, though it is important to note that the minimum
wage could affect other industries or elsewhere in the age and education distributions (e.g.
Neumark et al., 2004).
If the minimum wage is to be evaluated alongside alternative policy instruments for in-
creasing the standard of living of low-income households, a more conclusive understanding of
its effects is necessary. The primary implication of our study is that the minimum wage does
affect employment through a particular mechanism. This is important for normative analysis
in theoretical models (e.g. Lee and Saez, 2012) and for policymakers weighing the tradeoffs
between the increased wage for minimum wage earners and the potential reduction in hiring
and employment. Moreover, we reconcile the tension between the expected theoretical effect
of the minimum wage and the estimated null effect found by some researchers. We show that
because minimum wages reduce employment levels through dynamic effects on employment
growth, research designs incorporating state-specific time trends are prone to erroneously
estimated null effects on employment. In contrast, the minimum wage significantly reduces
job growth, at least in the context that we are able to analyze.
This article proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we provide a brief review of the literature
on the employment effects of the minimum wage and build our case for examining employ-
ment dynamics. Section 3 presents our econometric models and demonstrates that existing
approaches used in this literature obtain incorrect results if the true effect of the minimum
wage is on the growth rate of employment. Section 4 describes the data used in our study
and presents empirical results. We conclude in Section 5.
2
2 Theoretical and Empirical Framework
The economic literature on minimum wages is longstanding and vast. Neumark and Wascher
[2008] provide an in-depth review of the field, which continues to be characterized by dis-
agreement on how a minimum wage affects employment. The majority of recent studies,
following Card and Krueger [1994], use difference-in-differences comparisons to evaluate the
effect of these policies on employment levels. Recent papers generally focus on modifying
the specification to improve the quality of the counterfactual comparisons, with disagree-
ment on appropriate techniques and often-conflicting results (e.g. Allegretto et al., 2011 and
Neumark et al., 2013). Importantly, these models test whether there is a discrete change in
the level of employment before and after a state changes its minimum wage, relative to the
counterfactual change as measured by other states’ employment.
Yet there is basis in theory for believing that the minimum wage may not reduce the level
of employment in a discrete manner. While the basic analysis of the effects of the minimum
wage argues for rapid adjustments to a new equilibrium employment level (e.g. Stigler, 1946),
transitions to a new employment equilibrium may not be smooth [Hamermesh, 1989] or may
be relatively slow [Diamond, 1981; Acemoglu, 2001]. In this case, the effects of the policy may
be more evident in net job creation.2 In worker search-and-matching models (e.g. Van den
Berg and Ridder, 1998; Acemoglu, 2001; Flinn, 2006, 2011), summarized concisely in Cahuc
and Zylberberg [2004], the minimum wage has opposing effects on job creation. Although it
reduces demand for labor by raising the marginal cost of employing a new worker, a higher
minimum wage increases the gap between the expected returns to employment relative to
unemployment, inducing additional search effort from unemployed workers. By increasing
the pool of searching workers (and the intensity of their searching), the minimum wage
improves the quality of matches between employers and employees, generating surplus. The
theory thus has ambiguous predictions for the effect of a minimum wage on job creation. If
workers’ additional search effort sufficiently improves the worker-firm match quality, then job
creation should not be adversely affected and may even increase. However, if the demand-side
effect dominates, then increasing the minimum wage will cause declines in hiring.3
2Of course, any effect on growth does not exclude a discrete effect on the employment level. We separate
these types of effects in the illustrations that follow to facilitate clearer exposition.
3With our reduced-form empirical analysis, we cannot distinguish the true mechanism driving the rela-
tionship between the minimum wage and employment. For instance, it is possible possible that the minimum
wage would discretely affect employment, but that frictions in the labor market cause this effect to manifest
over time. At a practical and policy-relevant level, these two situations are equivalent, and we are agnostic on
the underlying mechanism which, as we discuss in Section 4.4, limits our ability to make sweeping statements
about how the minimum wage truly impacts labor markets.
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Sorkin [2013] builds a model that formalizes this potentially slow adjustment of labor
demand, focusing on firms’ difficulties in adjusting their capital-labor ratios, and applies it
to minimum wage increases. He argues that “the ability to adjust labor demand is limited
in the short run” and that this “provide[s] an explanation for the small employment effects
found in the minimum wage literature.” Fundamentally, this identification problem stems
from the “sawtooth pattern” exhibited in states’ real minimum wages. Sorkin argues that
“difference-in-difference faces challenges in measuring the treatment effect of interest, which
in this case is the effect of a permanent minimum wage increase, whenever there are dynamic
responses to the treatment and the treatment itself is time-varying.”
To be clear, if the true effect a minimum wage is to change the slope for employment
growth, rather than the employment level, then the traditional approaches used in this
literature – namely, difference-in-differences estimates of the effects of the minimum wage on
employment levels – will yield incorrect inference.4
2.1 Staggered Treatments and Difference-in-Differences
We illustrate this potential shortcoming of the classic difference-in-differences approach in
Figure 1. This toy example depicts employment in two hypothetical jurisdictions, which
initially exhibit identical growth rates. At some time t1, Jurisdiction A is treated; at some
later time t2, Jurisdiction B is treated with the same intensity. In Panel (a), treatment
has a discrete and symmetric negative effect on the employment level, whereas in Panel
(b), the treatment has a symmetric negative effect on employment growth, but does not
discretely alter the employment level. Consider the standard difference-in-differences (DiD)
identification of the employment effect:
Employmentit = δB · I{Jurisdiction = B}+ τt · I{Time = t}+β · I(Treatmentit = 1) +uit
Because both jurisdictions are initially untreated and both are eventually treated, the
only time period(s) in which the treatment effect β may be identified separately from the
time fixed effects τt are those during which only Jurisdiction A is treated. During all other
time periods, I(Treatmentit = 1) takes the same value for both states. Thus, the DiD model
compares the average difference in employment between the jurisdictions during the time
4Several recent studies are exceptions to the focus on employment levels. Dube et al. [2011] examine the
relationship between the minimum wage and employee turnover for teenagers and restaurant workers using
the 2001-2008 Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI). Brochu and Green [2013] assess firing, quit, and hiring
rates in Canadian survey data. Both studies find a reduction in hiring rates but do not estimate the effect
on net job growth.
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period between t1 and t2 to that in the time periods prior to t1 and following t2.
This evaluation is obvious for the discrete employment effect in Panel (a). The difference
between jurisdictions’ employment is clearly smaller during the middle time period, compared
to the outer time periods, and the DiD estimate is correctly some negative number. Moreover,
the duration of each of the three time periods is irrelevant for obtaining the correct inference.
If instead the treatment effect is on growth as in Panel (b), then DiD is very sensitive to
the relative duration of each (outer) time period. To highlight this sensitivity, consider first
the extreme case in which there is a long pre-treatment timespan between times zero and t1,
but a very short timespan between t2 and T , the end of the sample period. In this situation,
the average difference in employment during the outer time periods is determined nearly
entirely by the pre-treatment period, and the DiD estimate for the treatment effect will be
negative. Contrast this with the other extreme: a very short timespan between times zero
and t1, but a long period following t2, during which both jurisdictions are treated. In this
situation, the average difference in employment during the outer time periods is determined
nearly entirely by the later period, and the DiD estimate for the effect of the same treatment
will be positive. And, if T is selected such that the two outer periods have equivalent duration
(i.e. t1−0 = T − t2), then DiD yields a null treatment effect, visibly at odds with the plotted
time paths of employment.
This toy example underscores the pitfalls in using a standard difference-in-differences
model to identify treatment effects if there is staggered treatment intensity and the treatment
affects the growth of the outcome variable. As a state-level policy, the minimum wage clearly
exhibits this type of staggered treatment: Figure 2 (along with Appendix C) shows that the
effective minimum wage changed in at least one state in 33 of the 37 years from 1976 through
2012 – more than 700 changes in total – including every year after 1984.5 We investigate
the implications of this concern more thoroughly using Monte Carlo simulation in Section 3.
First, though, we discuss a separate but related concern.
5Inflation is an additional consideration when evaluating the minimum wage as a policy treatment. His-
torically, minimum wages have been set in nominal dollars, with their value eroding substantially over time
(see Appendix C for details). This means that the actual intensity of treatment changes over time, even in
the absence of any subsequent (own or counterfactual) explicit policy change. This situation would not be
problematic if the minimum wage affected employment in an abrupt, discrete manner. But if the minimum
wage predominantly affects job creation, then it may take years to observe a statistically significant difference
in the level of employment. In Section 4.4, we revisit the implications of inflation for minimum wage policy
in the context of our empirical findings.
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2.2 Implications of Jurisdiction Time Trends as Controls
Many recent studies of the minimum wage include state- or county-specific time trends to
control for heterogeneity in the underlying time-paths by which labor markets evolve within
different areas that might be correlated with treatment intensity (e.g. Page et al., 2005;
Addison et al., 2009; Allegretto et al., 2011). These models generally find little or no effect
of the minimum wage on employment levels. However, if the policy change affects the growth
rate of the response variable, rather than its level, then specifications including jurisdiction-
specific trends will mechanically attenuate estimates of the policy’s effect. The basic intuition
is that including state-specific time trends as controls will adjust for two sources of variation.
First, if there is any pre-treatment deviation in outcomes that is correlated with treatment
– e.g. if states that exhibit stronger employment growth are also more likely to increase
their minimum wage – then this confounding variation may be appropriately controlled for
by including state-specific time trends. The potential cost of this added control is that if the
actual treatment effect, the post-treatment employment variation, acts upon the trend itself,
then inclusion of jurisdiction time trends will attenuate estimates of the treatment effect and
often leads to estimating (statistical) null employment effects.6
A simple illustration of this is provided in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 depicts employment
in two hypothetical jurisdictions which exhibit identical employment growth rates prior to
period t = 0 . After period t = 0, the employment growth rate in the Treated jurisdiction
falls relative to the Control, but there is no discrete change in the level of employment.
Figure 4 presents the difference in employment by time period for both levels and growth,
with and without adjustment for jurisdiction time trends. The computed employment effect
is large and negative when state trends are omitted (in Panel (a)), but shrinks nearly to
zero with the inclusion of jurisdiction time trends (Panel (b)). This occurs despite identical
pre-treatment employment trends. In contrast, inference about the effect on employment
growth is the same regardless of whether the the data are detrended (Panels (c) and (d)),
because the effect on growth is discrete.
We are by no means the first to make this point. In examining the effects of changes
in divorce laws, Wolfers [2006] makes a general observation that a “a major difficulty in
difference-in-differences analyses involves separating out trends from the dynamic effects of
a policy shock.” Lee and Solon [2011] expound on this point in a discussion of Wolfers [2006],
pointing out that “the sharpness of the identification strategy suffers” when jurisdiction-
specific time trends are included and, “the shift in the dependent variable may vary with the
6We are grateful to Cheng Cheng and Mark Hoekstra, as well as Justin Wolfers for this insight.
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length of time since the policy change.” This problem has been discussed in other contexts,
including bias in estimates of the effects of desegregation (Baum-Snow and Lutz, 2011) and
marijuana decriminalization (Williams, 2014).
However, this approach remains common in the minimum wage literature and, indeed,
for many other important policy questions in which researchers ask “a much more nuanced
question than just whether the dependent variable series showed a constant discrete shift
at the moment of policy adoption” (Lee and Solon, 2011). We hope that our examples and
simulations will serve as a useful guide to researchers considering how to approach estimation
of policies whose effects may differ over time and, especially, may be reflected in changes in
the growth rate of the variable of interest. We delve further into the question of how best
to estimate these effects in Section 3.
3 Econometric Specifications and Simulations
In Section 2, we provide theoretical support for the hypothesis that the minimum wage
affects the growth rate of employment, even if it does not induce a discrete drop in the level
of employment, and we illustrate several complications for attempts to empirically quantify
the magnitude of such an employment effect. In this section, we present several econometric
models as candidates to estimate this effect, comparing their strengths and shortcomings
both analytically and using simulated data in a Monte Carlo framework. The goal of this
section is not to argue for one “correct” model to estimate the relationship between the
minimum wage and employment, but rather to underscore the tradeoff between the various
assumptions that can be invoked in order to obtain causal inference about this treatment
effect.
3.1 Candidate Specifications
Consider the following panel difference-in-differences model relating the minimum wage to
employment:
empit = αi + τt + γi · t +
s∑
r=0
βrmwit−r + ψ · controlsit + it
in which empit is the level of employment in state i at time t, αi are jurisdiction fixed effects,
τt are macroeconomic time period fixed effects, γi · t are jurisdiction-specific linear time
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trends, and it is the idiosyncratic error term.
If the true treatment effect is fully discrete in levels, as in the scenario depicted in Panel
(a) of Figure 1, then βr = 0 ∀r > 0, as lags of the minimum wage do not separately affect
the current employment level. The model reduces to:
empit = αi + τt + γi · t + β0mwit + ψ · controlsit + it (1)
and the estimate βˆ0 identifies the total causal impact of the minimum wage on employment.
Specification 1 is the “classic” variant of the difference-in-differences specification, in levels,
and has been used extensively in the literature.
In contrast, if the true treatment effect instead acts on the growth rate of employment,
as in the scenario depicted in Panel (b) of Figure 1, then βr 6= 0 for at least some lagged
values of the minimum wage. The full set of lag terms are necessary, yielding a distributed
lag model in levels:
empit = αi + τt + γi · t +
s∑
r=0
βrmwit−r + ψ · controlsit + it (2)
An alternate approach is to difference the model, yielding the distributed lag model in
first-differences:
∆empit = θt + γi +
s∑
r=0
βr∆mwit−r + ψ ·∆controlsit + ∆it (3)
Either Specification 2 or Specification 3 can be used to flexibly identify the dynamics of
the effect of the minimum wage on employment, and summing the βr identifies the overall
effect on the employment level. Whether it is preferable to estimate distributed lag coeffi-
cients using a fixed effects versus a first-differenced model is not clear.7 Nichols [2009] notes
that a major consideration in this decision is the timing between the change in treatment
and the observed effect, the theoretical relationship of which is not obvious in this context.
Moreover, depending on the degree of serial correlation between it and between ∆it, either
Specification 2 or 3 may be more efficient; as Wooldridge [2002] notes, the “truth is likely
to lie somewhere in between.” Our focus on importance of changes from year to year, as
opposed to comparing differences in pre- and post-periods, suggests that the first-differenced
approach is more appropriate in this case. Nevertheless, we leverage both variations of the
7An additional consideration is that the asymptotic properties of the fixed effects estimator rely on
N →∞, and there are only 51 U.S. jurisdictions (states) included in the data sets we evaluate.
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distributed lag model, testing them in the Monte Carlo simulation below and presenting
both in the primary results tables.
Although distributed lag models such as these are relatively common in the program
evaluation literature, both forms of the specification suffer from a common shortcoming when
examining minimum wage effects. Specifically, the high frequency variation in treatment
intensity makes it difficult to make credible causal inference about the employment effects of
higher-order lags of the minimum wage, because the large number of changes and potential
long-run confounders make a fully-specified model fragile. Put another way: in practice the
number of included lags s must be fairly small in any distributed lag specification, in either
levels or first-differences. Including only a short number of lag terms reduces the utility of
using a distributed lag specification to estimate an effect on growth.
Given this restriction on the number of lag terms that can sensibly be included, a natural
approach is to use a dynamic panel specification (e.g. Arellano and Bond, 1991). This
allows us to estimate both the short- and long-run effects, at the cost of imposing a stricter
assumption on the nature of this relationship. The specification then takes the form:
empit = µ · empit−1 + αi + τt + γi · t +
s∑
r=0
βrmwit−r + ψ · controlsit + it
which differs from the above models in that the lag of employment is included on the right
hand side. This can be first-differenced to eliminate the αi jurisdiction fixed effects:
∆empit = µ ·∆empit−1 + θt + γi +
s∑
r=0
βr∆mwit−r + ψ ·∆controlsit + ∆it (4)
In this dynamic panel model, the short run marginal effect of the minimum wage on employ-
ment is β0, and the effect after one year of a sustained change is captured by β1 +(1+µ)∗β0.
Due to the properties of a geometric series, the long run effect on employment is determined
by (β0 + β1)/(1 − µ). Importantly, this long run effect (in fact, the specific time path of
the effect) can be identified using only a single lag term for the minimum wage. Thus, a
dynamic panel specification skirts much – although not all – of the concern about constantly
changing treatment intensities.8
8In solving one identification problem, the dynamic panel approach introduces another, as the ∆emp
terms are autocorrelated. The standard practice, as in Arellano and Bond [1991], is to use deeper lags
of employment as instruments for the lagged employment term. However, these may not be exogenous,
depending on the degree of autocorrelation. As we discuss later, our results are robust to a number of
approaches, including the use of deeper lags of the minimum wage rather than employment as instruments.
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach.
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We have yet to discuss the role of the jurisdiction time trends, γi · t, in comparing these
specifications. Provided the true treatment effect is fully discrete in levels, then including
jurisdiction time trends will not bias the estimated βˆ0 in any of the above models (recall
that for an effect that is fully discrete in levels, βr = 0 ∀r > 0). Jurisdiction-specific time
trends can be included as controls for any underlying variation in employment trends –
which might be correlated with treatment intensity – without biasing the estimate for the
β0 parameter of interest. However, if the true treatment effect instead acts on the growth
rate of employment, then including jurisdiction time trends will bias estimates in all of
the above models. In this case, because the minimum wage actually affects the slope of the
employment trend, including jurisdiction-specific time trends in the specification will directly
bias estimates of the βr parameters of interest.9
One possibility to avoid this bias would be to identify the jurisdiction-specific time trends
using only pre-treatment time periods: that is, to estimate γi for each jurisdiction during
the pre-treatment period only, and then extrapolate these trajectories throughout the entire
study timeframe. This approach may work well for many studies in the program evaluation
literature, in which treatments are usually discrete one-time changes. However, the validity
of this approach requires that there actually is a sufficient pre-treatment period, a condition
that demonstrably fails to hold in the case of the minimum wage in the United States. In
this context, this first option is off the table.
A second option is to test for the presence of pre-treatment variation in employment
trends directly by using a common “leading values” falsification test, and – provided this
test is passed – simply exclude jurisdiction-specific time trends from the specification. Recall
that the concern is that jurisdictions which disproportionately increase their minimum wage
might have had comparatively negative employment trends even in the absence of differences
in treatment. If the econometric test reveals that this is unlikely to be the case, then the
model can be changed to force γi = 0 ∀i. The βr terms will yield unbiased estimates of the
distributed lag effects of the minimum wage provided that jurisdiction time trends are not
of importance in the true model.
Testing for pre-treatment deviation in outcomes should alleviate concerns about the im-
portance of controlling for heterogeneity in jurisdiction time trends. But, if it remains
unpalatable to eliminate jurisdiction time trends entirely from the model (and provided the
treatment effect is on growth), then the remaining option is to impose an additional strong
9Note that jurisdiction time trends would still bias estimates for a treatment effect on growth even if it
were possible to fully saturate the model with post-treatment lags of the treatment variable. The fundamental
issue stems from the treatment affecting the trend itself, as illustrated earlier in Figures 3 and 4.
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restriction by setting β0 ≡ β1 ≡ ... ≡ βs. This restriction requires that the minimum wage
affect employment growth discretely and permanently – that there is not a dynamic relation-
ship between the minimum wage and employment growth. This restriction is consistent with
the relationship depicted in Figure 3, in which the minimum wage causes a break-in-trend
for the employment level, rather than a discrete drop in the employment level. Provided
that this assumption holds, then:
s∑
r=0
βr∆mwit−r = β0 · (∆mwit + ∆mwit−1 + ...+ ∆mwit−s) = β0 ·mwit
and Specification 3 is equivalent to:
∆empit = θt + γi + β0 ·mwit + ψ ·∆controlsit + ∆it (5)
Specification 5, which we refer to as the “break-in-trend” model, is the only specification of
these five that is robust to including jurisdiction time trends without biasing estimates of βr
for a treatment effect on growth. This distinction comes at the cost of a strong assumption
about the nature of the dynamics of the treatment effect. In practice, it seems very unlikely
that the minimum wage would permanently reduce the growth rate of employment – indeed,
extrapolating such an effect far into the future would predict immense employment effects.
For this reason, we primarily view Specification 5 as a trends-robust indication of whether
the minimum wage affects the growth rate of employment, with the possibility of calcu-
lating back-of-the-envelope estimates of the magnitudes of proposed policy, given certain
assumptions. We return to this issue in detail in Section 4.4.
We will present results from each of these five specifications – classic, distributed lags in
levels, distributed lags in first-differences, dynamic panel, and break-in-trend – both with
and without including jurisdiction time trends, for all three data sets, in Section 4. First,
though, we use Monte Carlo repetitions of a fairly simple simulation to underscore how
severely time trends bias estimates of an effect on growth across these specifications.
3.2 Monte Carlo Simulation
In this section, we conduct a Monte Carlo exercise with simulated data to compare the
efficacy of the five models and to illustrate how severely including jurisdiction time trends
biases estimates when the treatment effect is on growth.
Our data generating process starts with an annual panel of actual state minimum wages
11
and employment (in the Business Dynamics Statistics data, discussed below in Section 4).
Drawing without replacement from these data, we form two independent distributions of
changes, one for real minimum wages and one for employment. We merge these distributions
together to form a new panel containing 35 periods for 51 state entities, repeating this process
within each Monte Carlo repetition.
Next, we impose a treatment effect relating the minimum wage to the growth rate of
employment. To prevent the effect from being purely deterministic, we draw the treatment
effect from a Normal(−0.03, 0.015) distribution for each state-year observation. That is,
each 10% increase in a state’s real minimum wage causes, in expectation, a 0.3 percentage
point reduction in employment growth. Because the effect is on the employment growth
rate, the treatment effect in a state in one year persists throughout all future years, a
pattern such as that illustrated earlier in Figure 3. While imposing this type of treatment
effect is extreme – an increase in the real minimum wage will permanently reduce the growth
rate of employment – it facilitates clarity in comparing the five models and highlighting the
concern with jurisdiction time trends.
With these simulated data, we estimate the relationship between the minimum wage
and employment using each of the five specifications, separately with and without including
jurisdiction time trends. Table 1 reports the median coefficients from 10,000 Monte Carlo
repetitions of these estimations.10 Consider first Column (1) in Panel [A], which excludes
jurisdiction time trends. The standard difference-in-differences model clearly identifies a
negative average treatment effect, though this coefficient does not clarify whether the treat-
ment discretely affects the level of the outcome or if it affects the growth rate. In contrast,
when time trends are added in Panel [B], the coefficient in Column (1) is attenuated to,
essentially, a zero estimated treatment effect. This occurs despite the fact that time trends
cannot actually be helpful for these estimations, because the simulated data have random
employment shocks that are by construction only correlated with minimum wages through
the imposed treatment effect.
The dynamics of the treatment effect are more salient in the distributed lag specifications
in Columns (2) and (3) of Panel [A]: it is clear that the treatment does not simply induce
a one-time contemporaneous drop in the level of the outcome, but instead continues to
negatively affect employment in future periods, i.e. an effect on growth. The pattern in
Column (2) for the estimated dynamics when using distributed lags in levels shows that
10The full code used in this simulation, along with all other code and data included in this study, is
available from the authors at http://econweb.tamu.edu/jmeer/Meer_West_MinimumWage_Code.zip.
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there is no contemporaneous effect on the employment level and an increasing cumulative
effect over time, with the final lag term capturing the remaining average treatment effect.
We somewhat arbitrarily opted to include only three lag terms, but this basic pattern of
a “zero” contemporaneous effect and a large final lag term holds regardless of the number
of lag terms included in Specification 2, be it one or many. The important thing to note
is that this approach does not yield accurate results, either, though it does highlight that
there is a dynamic response following the simulated treatment. Panel [B], which includes
time trends, shows an even larger deviation from the true effect, with a relatively large and
positive contemporaneous coefficient.
Turning to Column (3), the distributed lags with first differences model accurately cap-
tures the constant treatment effect that was imposed on growth. Yet as with the previous
two specifications, this model also exhibits attenuation of the estimates when jurisdiction
time trends are included in Panel [B].
Column (4) shows the results of the dynamic panel simulation. The autoregressive term
for the lag of employment is 0.852, with the contemporaneous minimum wage coefficient
equaling -0.019 and the first lag equaling -0.041. This implies that a permanent, real increase
in the minimum wage results in a short-run elasticity of -0.019 in the first year and -0.076
in the second year. The long-run effect, calculated as explained above, is -0.407. While this
model does require stricter assumptions, the primary advantage is the ability to examine the
short- and long-run elasticities; essentially, these results allow us to plot out the effect on
the level of employment, showing an initial dip to a new employment level that subsequently
runs parallel to that of the counterfactual.11 Much like the previous specifications, including
jurisdiction-specific trends in Panel [B] substantially biases the estimates: the short-run
impact changes to a positive 0.014 in the first year and 0.019 in the second year – that is,
not even the sign is correct – with a very small permanent effect of -0.016.
Finally, the Break-in-Trend specification in Column (5) identifies the nature of the “kink”
in the employment time path. We stress again that the accuracy of the estimated magnitude
of this coefficient depends on the validity of the strong identifying assumption about a
permanent effect on growth (which happens to be true by construction in this simulation).
The value of this specification is that – in only this model – the coefficient is not biased when
jurisdiction time trends are included, as we showed analytically above and as is evidenced
by comparing Panel [A] to Panel [B] of Column (5) in Table 1.
11Note that, in the case of the extreme data-generating process that we impose, this prediction is incorrect.
We discuss the general difficulties of making inference about permanent changes in the minimum wage,
especially without imposing model-based restrictions, in Section 4.4
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Summarizing the findings of this Monte Carlo simulation, we have shown that – if the
true treatment effect is on employment growth – including jurisdiction time trends can
starkly bias estimates from a difference-in-differences specification, whether the model is the
classic form, a distributed lag specification, or even a dynamic panel model. For exposition,
we simulated the extreme case of a permanent treatment effect of the real minimum wage
on employment growth. However, our findings generalize to drawing entire minimum-wage
histories rather than individual-year changes; to allowing the minimum wage treatment
intensity to be eroded due to inflation; to introducing underlying jurisdiction-specific trends
that are correlated with whether the jurisdiction has a high or low minimum wage; and
to treatment effects that attenuate over time. Most importantly, this simulation exercise
contrasts the various specifications that we will estimate in the next section and illustrates
the general pattern of results to be expected of an effect on employment growth.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Data
We estimate employment effects using three data sets: the Business Dynamics Statistics
(BDS) and the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI), both from the Bureau of the Census,
and the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The QCEW and QWI report quarterly employment for each state, while the BDS
is annual. All of these data are administrative in nature; the QCEW and QWI programs
collect data from county unemployment insurance commissions, while the BDS reports on
employment rosters furnished to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. As such, each of the
data sets we study accounts for virtually the entire population of non-farm employment.12
For brevity and clarity of exposition, we report results from the BDS in the main body of the
paper, with results from the full set of specifications using the QCEW and QWI in Appendix
12The employer-sourced administrative nature of these data is important for our research question.
Population-level data provide for a cleaner assessment of the overall policy impact of minimum wages by
avoiding sampling error. Moreover, as discussed in Section 2, a higher minimum wage may induce additional
searching effort on the part of the currently unemployed. Mincer [1976] shows that this positive supply
elasticity often leads to an increase in the number of unemployed that differs substantially from the change
in employment. Because employment is the policy-relevant outcome, measuring job counts using employer-
sourced data provides a better identification of any disemployment effects than do surveys of individuals,
such as the Current Population Survey. Finally, employment data directly reported by firms to maintain
legal compliance have been shown to be more accurate than responses to individual-level surveys such as the
CPS [Abraham et al., 2009].
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A. As we note below, there is little difference in the overall results across the three data sets,
which is unsurprising given that all three examine the near-population of jobs in the United
States.
The BDS covers all non-agriculture private employer businesses in the U.S. that report
payroll or income taxes to the IRS. The heart of the BDS is the Census Bureau’s internal
Business Register, which is sourced from mandatory employer tax filings and augmented
using the Economic Census and other data to compile annual linked establishment-level
snapshots of employment statistics (on March 12th). The Census Bureau releases the BDS
as a state-year panel (all fifty states, plus the District of Columbia), currently covering 1977
to 2011. Summary statistics from the BDS are provided in Table 2. Full descriptions of the
QCEW and QWI, including their summary statistics, are located in Appendix A.
4.1.1 State Minimum Wages
We draw historical data on state minimum wages from state-level sources.13 For the QCEW
and QWI, we use the minimum wage value as of the first of each quarter. For the BDS, we
use the value as of the previous March 12th each year, directly corresponding to the panel
years in the BDS data. Some states have used a multiple-track minimum wage system,
with a menu of wages that differ within a year across firms of different sizes or industries;
we therefore use the maximum of the federal minimum wage and the set of possible state
minimum wages for the year. To the extent that there is firm-level heterogeneity in the
applicable wage level, our definition allows the minimum wage term to serve as an upper
bound for the minimum wage a firm would actually face. We transform minimum wages into
constant 2011 dollars using the (monthly) CPI-U from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.14
4.1.2 Other Control Variables
Although our econometric specifications include an extensive set of time period controls,
precision may be gained by accounting for additional state-specific time-varying covariates.
13Although historical state minimum wage data are available from sources such as the U.S Department of
Labor (http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/stateMinWageHis.htm), these data suffer several limitations. For
one, minimum wage values are only reported only as of January first each year, whereas the panel used in our
study necessitates values as of other dates. Additionally these DOL data incompletely characterize changes
to state minimum wages, especially during the early years of our panel. This DOL table is frequently used
as the source of historical state minimum wage values for recent studies in this literature, and we caution
future researchers to be careful not to inadvertently attribute minimum wage changes to years in which they
did not occur.
14Because we use a national-level deflator, specifying the log minimum wage term as real or nominal does
not affect our results. Time period fixed effects incorporate this added variation.
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The Census Bureau’s Population Distribution Branch provides annual state-level population
counts, including estimates for intercensal values. Total state population represents a deter-
minant of both demand for (indirectly by way of demand for goods and services) and supply
of employees. Because states differ non-linearly in their population changes, controlling di-
rectly for population may be important. The range in population between states and across
time is enormous, so we use the natural log of state population in our specifications. We
additionally include the share of this population aged 15-59, which provides a rough weight
for how population might affect demand for versus supply of labor. Demographic controls
such as these are commonly used in this literature (e.g. Burkhauser et al., 2000; Dube et al.,
2010). Following Orrenius and Zavodny [2008], we also include the natural log of real gross
state product per capita.15 After controlling for state population, this term can be thought
of as a rough proxy for average employee productivity as well as a measure of state-level
fluctuations in business cycles [Carlino and Voith, 1992, Orrenius and Zavodny, 2008].
4.2 Results
We begin with a very simple diagnostic check: if the true effect of the minimum wage
is on growth, then specifications that are differenced over increasingly long time periods
should yield larger coefficients for the effect of the minimum wage on employment. We take
Equation 3 with a single minimum wage term, and increase the number of years over which
we difference the equation. Indeed, this simple check shows evidence for effects on growth:
the coefficient on the minimum wage term for a one-year difference is -0.020 (s.e. = 0.018);
taking the difference from two years previously changes the coefficient to -0.039 (s.e. =
0.021); for three years, it is -0.050 (s.e. = 0.024); for four years, it is -0.051 (s.e. = 0.024).
The coefficient is stable around this magnitude even when differencing by as much as eight
years, and similar results are seen in the QCEW and QWI. While this diagnostic does not
provide definitive proof that the effects of the minimum wage are on growth – after all, many
other factors can change over such long periods – the absence of such a pattern could be
taken as evidence against our hypothesis.
In Table 3, we present results for the five specifications from Section 3 to identify the
effect of the minimum wage on employment using the Business Dynamics Statistics (as
mentioned above, results for the QCEW and QWI are available in Appendix A). Of course,
15We compute the log of the real value of total GSP per capita using all industry codes, including gov-
ernment. Results are virtually unaffected by using ln(real private sector GSP/capita) instead, but we view
total GSP as the more appropriate definition given that the population term reflects total state population.
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estimations using the actual data do not generate coefficients that are as tidy as those using
a prescribed data-generating process.16 Nevertheless, the models in Section 3 that are shown
to accurately capture effects on growth yield similar estimates in all three data sets, and,
broadly, estimates across all specifications show similar patterns to their counterparts using
the artificially-generated data.
We focus first on Panel [A], which excludes the jurisdiction-specific trend terms. The
classic difference-in-differences model in Column (1), which corresponds to Specification 1
in Section 3, shows a significant disemployment effect of the minimum wage. Specifically,
the estimate is that a permanent ten percent increase in the real minimum wage causes
about a 1.7 percent decline in total employment. As with the results from the Monte Carlo
simulation, the classic model cannot distinguish between an effect on growth and a discrete
effect on the employment level. The dynamics of the treatment effect are more apparent in
the distributed lag model in Column (2). It is clear that the effect is not encompassed in a
one-time discrete drop in employment; rather, the minimum wage appears to have a fairly
constant negative effect on the growth rate of employment over the period covered by the
lags. The effects for each minimum wage coefficient are negative and, with the exception of
the third lag, statistically significant. A permanent increase in the minimum wage, according
to this model, would yield an employment elasticity of -0.29 (s.e. = 0.06). In Column (3),
the distributed lag model in first differences, we see a fairly steady and negative impact of the
minimum wage on employment, similar to the one found in Table 1; the third lag is positive
and statistically insignificant, suggesting that the effects of a minimum wage change fade
out after about three years, though this pattern could also result from the high-frequency
variation in minimum wage changes. Importantly, much of the impact comes in the two
years after the change, suggesting that short-term data immediately after an increase in the
minimum wage is unlikely to show its true impact. Summing up these coefficients yields
the effect of a permanent change: -0.074 (s.e. = 0.036).17 Irrespective of the magnitudes,
we view the results in these two columns as strong evidence that the effect of the minimum
wage on employment is of a more dynamic nature than that supposed in the frictionless
16This reduced precision is partly a (lack of) Law of Large Numbers issue: the simulation had 10,000
repetitions of 1785 observations to obtain those coefficients, whereas these results have only the 1785 real-
world observations, based on 51 jurisdictions . In addition, unlike in the simulation, real minimum wages
are not randomly assigned: there is strong bunching of changes around certain years, for instance. Finally,
the simulation prescribed a simple effect just on employment growth, whereas the minimum wage in practice
could affect both the level and growth of employment.
17Additional lags do not make a qualitative difference to the sum of coefficients, and the coefficients on
the first three minimum wage terms remain similar in magnitude and significance.
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neoclassical framework. This is further evidenced by the dynamic panel specification in
Column (4).18 The contemporaneous elasticity of a minimum wage increase is -0.031 (s.e.
= 0.017), with the lag term (-0.054, s.e. = 0.02) implying that the impact after one year at
the same treatment intensity would be -0.10 (s.e. = 0.033) and after two years, -0.14 (s.e. =
0.49); the long-run impact of a permanent real increase in the minimum wage effect is -0.20
(s.e. = 0.088).
Contrast these results with those in Panel [B], in which jurisdiction-specific trend terms
are included. Across the first four models, the coefficients are sharply attenuated and few
remain statistically different from zero. Given the clear evidence in Panel [A] that the effect
is not discrete on the employment level, this attenuation is exactly what we would expect
based on the theoretical and econometric arguments made in Sections 2 and 3. Moreover,
the pattern to this contrast between Panels [A] and [B] of Table 3 closely mirrors that shown
in the Monte Carlo simulation in Table 1: including jurisdiction trends mechanically biases
the estimated coefficients across all four models.
Finally, consider the Break-in-Trend model in Column (5). Note that to ensure identifi-
cation is coming from within-jurisdiction changes in minimum wage, we include the initial
minimum wage by jurisdiction as an additional control in Panel [A].19 The strong assumptions
underlying this specification require caution in drawing causal inference about the magnitude
of the estimated employment effect.20 That said, it is reassuring that this model yields an
estimate in Panel [A] that is similar in magnitude to the per-period coefficients identified for
18The standard approach is to use deeper lags of the dependent variable as instruments [Arellano and
Bond, 1991]. Concerns about endogeneity suggest using deeper lags of the minimum wage values themselves
as instruments. We use Roodman’s (2009) Stata module, which allows for flexible estimation of dynamic
panel models, using this approach, though the coefficients on the minimum wage terms are stable across
different sets of instruments. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
19The essence of the difference-in-differences identification strategy is to identify the effect using temporal
variation within jurisdiction, rather than between jurisdictions. Whereas Columns (1)-(4) either include a
jurisdiction fixed effect or first-difference the minimum wage term, Specification (5) in Panel [A] does neither.
In the absence of a jurisdiction fixed effect (which is added to Specification (5) in Panel [B]), including the
initial minimum wage by jurisdiction controls for heterogeneity in the baseline differences in jurisdictions’
minimum wages and ensures that identification comes from within-jurisdiction variation. This was not an
issue in the simulation, for which initial minimum wage values were randomly assigned.
20This is not to say that the results do not hold implications for nominally-set minimum wages. One
reasonable approach is to apply the average “erosion” rates of the minimum wage in the data (see Appendix
C for historical minimum wage erosion rates, as well as the discussion in Section 4.4). Suppose that a
state increases its nominal minimum wage by 10% relative to other states within its Census region. The
average erosion rate in our panel predicts a remaining effective difference of 6.64% after one year. This
relative difference shrinks to 3.87% by the next year, to 2.31% the year after, and to 0.84% after four years,
before fully eroding. This suggests a cumulative that is 2.37 times the coefficient in the break-in-trend graph,
implying a long-run employment elasticity for the type of minimum wage increases seen in the data of -0.064.
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first-differences in the distributed lag model in Column (3). Perhaps more importantly, the
estimated coefficient in Specification (5) changes little (and remains statistically equivalent)
when jurisdiction trends are included in Panel [B]. We view this as further evidence that
trends are not a confounding factor, but if anything, the slight increase in magnitude shows
that estimates are biased towards zero when trends are omitted from these models.
4.3 Additional Specifications and Robustness Checks
In this section, we present a number of alternative specifications to assess the robustness of
our empirical results. Most importantly, we perform the common leading-values falsification
test for pre-treatment deviation in employment outcomes, thereby examining the validity
of the key identifying assumption underlying the difference-in-difference methodology.21 In
addition, we show that our results are consistent for different time periods within our sam-
ple, and demonstrate invariance of our results to allowing for finer spatial and time controls,
accounting for minimum wage inflation indexing, and dropping the years of the recent fi-
nancial crisis. For these additional results, we present estimates using Specification 3, the
distributed lag model in first-differences, and Specification 5, the Break-in-Trend model, as
these two specifications most accurately identify the effect on growth in the Monte Carlo
simulation.
Robustness checks using Specification 3 are in Table 4. Column (1) replicates the results
from Column (3) of Table 3: Panel [A], for comparison. Columns (2)-(4) include either the
first or second leading value of the minimum wage, or both. If increases in the minimum wage
appear to have an effect on employment dynamics before their implementation – especially if
contemporaneous changes lose their effect – then our results might be driven by unobserved
trends. This is not the case: although some precision is lost, the contemporaneous and
lagged minimum wage coefficients in Columns (2)-(4) remain close to those in Column (1),
and the leading value terms are comparatively small and statistically insignificant. This
strongly suggests that confounding trends leading to both lower job growth and higher
minimum wages are not a factor. In Column (5), we allow the time effects to vary by Census
Division, rather than Region; the coefficients remain similar to those in Column (1). Some
precision is lost, though this to be expected – there are four Census Regions containing
21An additional approach to examine the potential endogeneity of minimum wage changes is to examine
the results with different combinations of the time-varying covariates. Results from different combinations
of time fixed effects (national versus Region versus Division) and other time-varying controls are stable in
magnitude, sign, and significance, particularly across the specifications shown above to accurately reflect
minimum wage effects, namely, distributed lags with first differences, dynamic panel, and break-in-trend.
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nine Divisions, and the median Division includes only five states. In Column (6), we assess
whether states that have shifted to indexing their minimum wage for inflation affect our
results by dropping these observations. Results remain similarly unchanged. Finally, in
Column (7), we evaluate the role of the 2008-2009 recession. Because we include time period
fixed effects, the recent recession should not unduly affect our results. However, these two
years of our panel additionally experienced several large and high frequency changes in real
minimum wage levels, primarily resulting from the federal increases during these years (see
Figure 2). As a check that these particular years are not overly influencing identification of
the minimum wage term, we estimate specifications using only pre-2008 data. Again, the
estimated effects are not meaningfully different from our main results, though the sum of
the minimum wage terms is significant only at p = 0.13; this is somewhat unsurprising given
that about fifteen percent of the observations are lost.
Table 5 presents the additional results for the Break in Trend model, Specification 5.
Column (1) reproduces the main estimates from Table 3. In Column (2), we include an
indicator which equals one if the nominal minimum wage changes the following period. In
Columns (3)-(4), we include the leading value of the log of the minimum wage either two
or three periods in advance.22 Columns (5)-(7) present, respectively, results using Division-
by-year fixed effects, observations without inflation-indexed minimum wages, and pre-2008
data only. As with the distributed lags of first-differences model, these alternative results
reflect those in the baseline specification, and the break-in-trend model consistently indicates
a statistically significant and economically meaningful effect of the minimum wage on em-
ployment growth. Coefficients for the leading indicator or values of the minimum wage again
support the validity of the difference-in-differences identifying assumption in this context.
We additionally evaluate the sensitivity of the results to the time period used. For
difference-in-differences estimates, there is nearly always a concern that results could be
particular to the time-span included in the study. Generally, it seems most appropriate to
use all available periods within a data set unless given a compelling reason to do otherwise.
22Note that we do not include a one-period leading value nor include multiple leads simultaneously. This
is because there is explicit collinearity between the current and the lag of the minimum wage term. For
simplicity, suppose that the true data-generating process is Yt = β1ln(MWt) + t. Ordinarily, including
ln(MWt+1) would show no effect in this regression. However, since Yt = (empt − empt−1) and ln(MWt+1)
is related to Yt+1, which includes empt, adding a single-period lead introduces substantial endogeneity. This
is not an issue for leads of at least two periods difference from each other. If the pre-trend identification
assumption is violated, it is difficult to believe that it would not be apparent two periods prior as well.
Moreover, including a binary variable for whether there is a change in the following period (as opposed to
the actual minimum wage value) yields little indication that there is some negative shock that is correlated
with both increases in the minimum wage and reductions in job growth.
20
However, such an approach cannot guarantee that estimated effects are not particular to the
time period used. We evaluate results obtained from estimating Specification 5 separately
for all possible subsample spans of two or more consecutive years in the BDS (1977-2011),
yielding 595 point estimates using the BDS. We also examine the QCEW, which has 704 such
periods.23 Appendix B includes histograms of these coefficients. Sorted by magnitude, the
median coefficient is -0.0322 in the BDS, and the first point estimate with a positive value is
at the 96th percentile. This exercise indicates that the result of a negative job growth effect
of the minimum wage is not simply an artifact of the time spans of data used in this study.
We also examine the effects of the minimum wage by industry, age group, and education
level in Section A.2.2.
4.4 Discussion
Our results show that the minimum wage negatively affects employment and that this oc-
curs over a period of several years. The results from the distributed lag specification in
first differences suggest that a 10% permanent increase in the real minimum wage reduces
employment by about 0.7 percent after three years. In the dynamic panel model, we leverage
additional assumptions to estimate an employment elasticity of about -0.17 after three years
and -0.20 in the long run. Taken at face value, our most restrictive model, the break-in-trend
specification, suggests that a 10% permanent increase in the real minimum wage reduces job
growth by about 0.3 percentage points annually, or about 15 percent of the baseline level.
This effect is not small, and extrapolated sufficiently into the future this implies a deleterious
effect on employment of enormous magnitude, far surpassing that of any historical recession.
The purpose of this section is to caveat our findings and to place the results into perspective
for considering the short- and long-run impact of minimum wage policy.
First, we study employment effects in the context of policies in the United States over
the past few decades, during which increases in minimum wages have been relatively small
in magnitude, albeit frequent. Extrapolating the effect we estimate to the distant future or
to much larger increases in the minimum wage requires strong assumptions and is a wildly
out-of-sample prediction, one that we refrain from making. Essentially, there is no way –
without model-based assumptions – to gain a full understanding of the dynamic responses
to a large, real and permanent increase in the minimum wage, because no such change has
23For an initial year of 1977, the BDS has 34 possible spans of at least two years: 1977-1978, 1977-1979,
1977-1980, ..., 1977-2011. An initial year of 1978 has 33 possible such spans, etc. For the QCEW, we could
instead consider spans of quarters, but this would not add much in the way of inference. Note that the QWI
is too short and too unbalanced to benefit from this exercise.
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ever occurred in the data. This issue is not specific to our study, but does hamper the ability
of researchers in this field to make definitive statements on the effects of these policies.
Second, our specifications estimate the relationship between the real minimum wage and
employment. Historically, most minimum wage changes have been set in nominal terms and
not adjusted for inflation. As we show in Appendix C, inflation substantially erodes the “bite”
of a wage floor over time; this is not because nominal minimum wages affect employment less
significantly than do real minimum wages but rather because the intensity of the policy itself
is mitigated. This is illustrated in our brief discussion in Footnote 20, in which we apply the
“erosion” rate of the treatment intensity to our break-in-trend specification to evaluate the
effect of a nominal minimum wage increase.
The upshot of this distinction is that nominally-denoted minimum wages should have a
smaller employment impact than a wage floor that is indexed for inflation. To date, little
is known empirically about how inflation indexing may alter the effects of a minimum wage
on employment even as at least ten states now use regional CPI measures to index their
minimum wages for inflation, a relatively recent practice [Allegretto et al., 2011]. Ongoing
minimum wage proposals, such as the federal minimum wage increase proposed by President
Obama in 2013, continue to include provisions indexing the wage floor for inflation. As such,
this line of inquiry is likely to grow in importance.
5 Conclusion
We examine whether the minimum wage impacts employment through a discrete change in
its level or if it is reflected over time through a change in the growth rate. Much of the
previous literature on the topic has assumed that an increase in the minimum wage results
in a relatively rapid adjustment in employment. Yet, there are theoretical reasons to believe
that this change may be slower. Using both illustrative models and Monte Carlo simulations,
we show that the empirical specifications used in the prior literature will systematically err
if the true effects are on growth rates. Moreover, we show that the common practice in this
literature of including jurisdiction-specific time trends will bias estimates towards zero in
this case.
We show results from three administrative data sets that consistently indicate negative
effects of the minimum wage on job growth. Our results are robust to a number of spec-
ifications, and we find that the minimum wage reduces employment over a longer period
of time than has been previously examined in the literature. This phenomenon is particu-
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larly important given the evidence that minimum wage jobs often result in relatively rapid
transitions to higher-paying jobs [Even and Macpherson, 2003].
This paper, of course, does not settle the debate of a contentious topic, but we do
shed light on the mechanisms by which the minimum wage affects employment and provide
directions for future research delving more deeply into the dynamics of this relationship.
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(a) Treatment effect discrete in levels
(b) Treatment effect discrete in growth
Figure 1: Illustration of two types of treatment effects with staggered treatments
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Figure 2: Frequency of increases to effective state nominal minimum wages (1976-2012)
Figure 3: Simple example of disemployment effect in growth rate
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(a) Levels: without trends (b) Levels: residual to trends
(c) Growth: without trends (d) Growth: residual to trends
Figure 4: Example difference-in-differences without versus with jurisdiction time trends
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Table 1: Estimates from Monte Carlo simulation exercise
Simulated Classic Distributed lag Dynamic Break-in-
True Effect DiD Levels FD Panel Trend
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
[A] Without trends
Log-MW -0.0300 -0.2750 -0.0005 -0.0299 -0.0190 -0.0300
1st lag of log-MW -0.0300 -0.0242 -0.0301 -0.0412
2nd lag of log-MW -0.0300 -0.0229 -0.0302
3rd lag of log-MW -0.0300 -0.2855 -0.0302
1st lag of employment 0.852
[B] Jurisdiction trends
Log-MW -0.0300 -0.0153 0.0310 -0.0164 0.0135 -0.0299
1st lag of log-MW -0.0300 -0.0158 -0.0156 -0.0201
2nd lag of log-MW -0.0300 -0.0143 -0.0146
3rd lag of log-MW -0.0300 -0.0605 -0.0137
1st lag of employment 0.593
Notes: The data generating process simulates a true effect of Normal(-0.03, 0.015) relating the minimum
wage to the first difference of employment. Columns (1) - (5), which correspond to Specifications (1)
- (5) as discussed in Section 3, report the median coefficients from 10,000 Monte Carlo repetitions for
each model, separately for specifications with and without jurisdiction-specific time trends.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for state characteristics and employment
Business Dynamics Statistics (Annual, 1977 - 2011)
Mean Std. Dev. Median
State minimum wage ($) 4.40 1.360 4.25
State minimum wage ($real) 7.09 0.916 6.89
Jobs (thousands) 1888.0 2103.8 1224.9
Job growth (thousands) 27.2 85.59 15.4
Job growth (log) 0.017 0.0348 0.019
Job creation (thousands) 314.8 370.4 206.5
Job destruction (thousands) 282.0 337.3 180.1
State annual characteristics
Population (thousands) 5160.6 5725.6 3513.4
Share aged 15-59 0.62 0.0196 0.62
GSP/capita ($real) 41591.6 16309.7 38447.1
Observations 1785
Notes: We define each state’s minimum wage annually as of March 12 in
the BDS, using the maximum of the federal minimum wage and the state’s
minimum wage each period, drawn from state-level sources. Employment
statistics are computed for the aggregate population of non-agricultural
employees in each state. Job growth is the annual change in each state’s
employment level. All real dollar amounts are indexed to $2011 using the
CPI-Urban.
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Table 3: Estimated effect of the minimum wage on employment (Business Dynamics Statistics)
Classic Distributed lag Dynamic Break-in-
DiD Levels FD Panel Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
[A] Without trends
Log-MW -0.1693*** -0.0825*** -0.0204 -0.0309* -0.0243***
(0.0383) (0.0233) (0.0162) (0.0171) (0.0078)
1st lag of log-MW -0.0524*** -0.0321** -0.0543***
(0.0184) (0.0139) (0.0204)
2nd lag of log-MW -0.0503*** -0.0304**
(0.0131) (0.0128)
3rd lag of log-MW -0.0552 0.0093
(0.0410) (0.0147)
1st lag of employment 0.5772***
(0.0960)
[B] Jurisdiction trends
Log-MW -0.0125 0.0021 -0.0174 -0.0099 -0.0271**
(0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0125)
1st lag of log-MW -0.0166 -0.0278** -0.0242
(0.0153) (0.0136) (0.0149)
2nd lag of log-MW -0.0161 -0.0258**
(0.0150) (0.0127)
3rd lag of log-MW 0.0384 0.0169
(0.0314) (0.0136)
1st lag of employment 0.3160***
(0.0925)
Observations 1785 1632 1581 1683 1734
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered by state and reported
in parentheses. Columns (1)-(5) correspond to Specifications (1) - (5) in Section 3; coefficients for each model
are reported separately with and without jurisdiction-specific time trends. All specifications include Census
Region by year fixed effects and state-level annual controls for log-population, the share aged 15-59, and log
real gross state product per capita. Controls are first-differenced for columns (3)-(5), as in the corresponding
specifications. Column (5) of Panel [A] also includes a control for the initial minimum wage in each state to
ensure that the identifying variation is within rather than between states. See the text for discussion.
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Table 4: Robustness checks for the effect of the minimum wage in the distributed lag first-differences model
Baseline Leading values tests Division Inflation Pre-2008
results t+ 1 t+ 2 Both time FE indexing only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log-MW -0.0204 -0.0206 -0.0176 -0.0178 -0.0188 -0.0226 -0.0219
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
1st lag of log-MW -0.0321** -0.0336** -0.0267 -0.0283 -0.0310* -0.0268 0.0020
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.023)
2nd lag of log-MW -0.0304** -0.0317** -0.0337** -0.0353** -0.0244 -0.0343** -0.0467***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
3rd lag of log-MW 0.0093 0.0084 0.0119 0.0109 0.0107 0.0074 0.0162
(0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023)
Sum MW effects -0.0736** -0.0776** -0.0660 -0.0705 -0.0634 -0.0764** -0.0504
(0.036) (0.038) (0.046) (0.049) (0.051) (0.034) (0.033)
1st lead of log-MW -0.0075 -0.0073
(0.008) (0.010)
2nd lead of log-MW 0.0060 0.0057
(0.012) (0.012)
Observations 1581 1581 1530 1530 1581 1536 1377
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 Notes: Column (1) replicates Specification (3) without trends from
Table 3. Separately: Columns (2) - (4) include, respectively, the leading value of the log minimum wage at time
t+1 or t+2, or both. Column (5) uses Division-by-time fixed effects, rather than Region-by-time. Column (6)
drops the observations with an inflation-indexed state minimum wage, and Column (7) uses only pre-2008 data.
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Table 5: Robustness checks for the effect of the minimum wage in the break-in-trend model
Baseline Leading values tests Division Inflation Pre-2008
results t+ 1 t+ 2 Both time FE indexing only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log-MW -0.0243*** -0.0240*** -0.0221** -0.0259** -0.0321** -0.0286*** -0.0261***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008)
I(∆MWt+1) -0.0019
(0.002)
2nd lead of log-MW -0.0043
(0.007)
3rd lead of log-MW 0.0018
(0.007)
Observations 1734 1734 1683 1632 1734 1689 1530
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 Notes: Column (1) replicates Specification (5) without trends from Table
3. Separately: Column (2) adds an indicator equal to one if the nominal minimum wage increases in the following period.
Columns (3) - (4) include, respectively, the leading value of the log minimum wage at time t+2 or t+3. Column (5) uses
Division-by-time fixed effects, rather than Region-by-time. Column (6) drops the observations with an inflation-indexed
state minimum wage, and Column (7) uses only pre-2008 data.
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A Results using additional data sets
In this appendix we provide empirical results similar to those in the main text, but using
data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages and the Quarterly Workforce
Indicators, rather than from the Business Dynamics Statistics. The results are consonant
with those in Section 4.2. Note that these data are quarterly rather than annual. As
such, additional lags are included in the distributed lag models to cover the same span as
the annual specifications from the BDS, and the break-in-trend models are the effects on
quarterly rather than annual growth.
A.1 Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW)
The Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), housed at the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, is a program which originated in the 1930s to tabulate employment and wages of
establishments which report to the Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs of the United
States. Per the BLS, employment covered by these UI programs today represents about
99.7% of all wage and salary civilian employment in the country (including public sector
employment). The BLS currently reports QCEW data by state for each quarter during
1975-2012, a span slightly longer than that of the BDS.24 The data are disaggregated by
NAICS industry codes for 1990-2012.
A.1.1 Results
In Tables A.2 and A.3, we compare results for the five specifications discussed in Section 3,
both with and without state-specific time trends. As with the Business Dynamics Statistics,
we find that the classic difference-in-differences specification yields a negative and statisti-
cally significant elasticity of -0.14 that is reduced to 0.001 when trends are included. Simi-
larly, the sum of the coefficients in a distributed lag model with fixed effects is reduced from
a statistically significant -0.25 to a small and insignificant -0.033. Similar to the BDS, dis-
tributed lag models estimated with first differences produce approximately the same result.
The estimated elasticity is nearly identical to that found in the BDS at about -0.075 (s.e.
= 0.034). We include four minimum wage terms in the dynamic panel model and produce
a predicted permanent effect of -0.11 (s.e. = 0.043); as expected, the effects are smaller
in magnitude when trends are included.25 Finally, the break-in-trend model yields similar
coefficients with and without time trends. Since the QCEW is a quarterly data set, the
coefficient must be scaled for comparison to the BDS. Doing so produces an estimated effect
on the growth rate of -0.034, quite similar to that found in Table 3.
24Employment levels – and therefore also quarterly job growth rates – are not available in the QCEW for
Alaska and the District of Columbia for any quarters during 1978-1980. Employment data is not missing for
any other states or periods.
25These results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar when additional lags of the minimum wage are
included.
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We conduct the same set of robustness checks on the QCEW results as we did on the
BDS in Tables 4 and 5. These can be found in Tables A.6 and A.7. The leading values
tend to be small and positive, suggesting that confounding trends leading to both lower job
growth and higher minimum wages are not at work.
Taken together, the results from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages are in
line with those that use the Business Dynamics Statistics and provide further evidence that
the effects of the minimum wage are on growth.
A.2 Quarterly Workforce Indicators
The Quarterly Workforce Indicators are data provided as part of the Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics (LEHD) program by the Bureau of the Census. Similar to the QCEW,
these data originate from county employment insurance filings.26 Compared to the QCEW
or BDS, an advantage of the QWI is that these data offer finer measures of employees
demographics such as age.
Yet, for our research design, a major shortcoming of the QWI is the substantially shorter –
and highly unbalanced – length of the panel. At its onset in 1990, only four states opted into
the QWI program, and additional states gradually joined each year (except 1992) through
2004. From 2004 on, the QWI includes forty-nine states (Massachusetts and Washington,
D.C. are never included). Thus, the starting date for QWI participation varies considerably
across states, and many are relatively recent. This is a particular concern for the distributed
lag models, as including sixteen minimum wage terms reduces the sample size by over twenty
percent.
Because the QWI is a highly unbalanced state panel, we make several other minor adjust-
ments to certain specifications. In particular, for results in the QWI using the differenced
Specifications 3 and 5 with included jurisdiction time trends – i.e. those in the “with trends”
panel – we include both a jurisdiction fixed effect and a jurisdiction-by-year variable for each
jurisdiction. Unlike in a balanced panel such as the BDS or QCEW, in the QWI these terms
are not perfectly collinear. In fact, both terms are necessary in order to appropriately con-
trol for jurisdiction time trends. Recall that the motivation for including jurisdiction time
trend terms is to control for any underlying heterogeneity in the time paths for jurisdictions’
employment. But, in an unbalanced panel the jurisdiction time trend terms will be sensitive
to the representation of jurisdictions across time. This means that jurisdictions will differ in
their time trend terms simply because of when the jurisdictions are represented in the panel,
irrespective of any actual economic differences between jurisdictions. Intuitively, this issue is
resolved by including both a jurisdiction fixed effect (which accounts for differing represen-
tation) and also a jurisdiction-by-quarter term in the differenced specifications for the QWI.
In addition, when using the initial minimum wage as a control in the Break-in-Trend model
(without trends), we use the 1990 value for each state (1990 being the earliest year for any
jurisdiction in the QWI, though, in practice, this choice of year does not seem to matter).
26In fact, the QWI and QCEW originate identically from the same county unemployment insurance records.
Thus, differences in the data stem from either the periods during which each state or county is included, or
differing imputation methods employed by BLS versus Census [Abowd and Vilhuber, 2013].
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A.2.1 Results
We conduct a similar exercise to that in Section A.1.1 with the QWI, presenting results in
Tables A.4 and A.5. We again note that a negative and statistically significant elasticity
from the classic difference-in-differences specification is reduced to zero when trends are
included; while the sum of coefficients in the distributed lag model in levels is not statistically
significant, it too is attenuated when trends are included. But as with the QCEW above,
the distributed lag model in first differences produces a negative and statistically significant
long-run coefficient of -0.10 with and without trends. The dynamic panel model yields a
predicted permanent effect of -0.053 (s.e. = 0.025); while none of the individual coefficients
are statistically significant, the overall effect is significant at p = 0.037. Finally, the break-
in-trend model yields a statistically significant coefficient of -0.0076, much like that from
both the QCEW and, when scaled to an annual effect of -0.030, the BDS.
As with the QCEW, the results from the QWI perform well in the robustness checks in
Tables A.6 and A.7. As expected, some precision is lost in the leading-values tests, but the
magnitudes are consistent across the various specifications.
The results from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators, especially in conjunction with those
from the QCEW above, underscore that our findings are not driven by the use of the Business
Dynamics Statistics.
A.2.2 Industry, Age, and Education
To this point, we have presented results for virtually the entire workforce, including workers
of all ages in all industries. In this section, we disaggregate the effect on job growth rates
by industry, age group, and educational attainment (for adults 25 years and older). The
BDS does not report separate employment outcomes by state and industry, but these are
disaggregated in the QCEW and QWI. The QWI additionally reports outcomes by age group
and education level. In Table A.8, we estimate the effects of the minimum wage in different
industries (two-digit NAICS code), focusing on the break-in-trend model (with jurisdiction
time trends) for brevity.27 Much of the literature focuses on one or several industries that are
conjectured to be more responsive to changes in the minimum wage. Echoing points made
in Clemens and Wither [2014], we choose to show all industries as it is not necessarily clear
which particular industry codes ought not to be sensitive to the minimum wage. That said,
industries that tend to have a higher concentration of low-wage jobs show more deleterious
effects on job growth from higher minimum wages, and the results appear consistent between
the QCEW and QWI.28 Of the 40 coefficients we report in the two data sets, none are positive
and statistically significant.
Table A.9 shows the effects of higher minimum wages by age bin reported in the QWI
using the break-in-trend model. As one might expect, the effects are by far the strongest on
27See http://www.naics.com/search.htm for a full list of the component industries of each category.
28It may seem anomalous that professional services would be negatively affected, but firms in this category
span a broad array, from lawyers’ offices to direct mail advertising. The large negative effect on the offices
of holding companies (“management”) is perhaps stranger; note, though, that the effect is only present in
the QCEW and that this category has among the fewest firms of any industry.
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those aged 14 to 18, twice the size of the effect on those age 19 to 21 and over three times the
size of the effect on those age 22 to 24. By age 35, the effects are very small and insignificant;
they rise again but remain statistically insignificant for those over age 65. Similarly, Table
A.10 shows results by education level for adults aged 25 and over. Since the effects of the
minimum wage are heavily concentrated among younger workers, the overall effect of the
minimum wage is smaller for this group. Yet the effects are strongest for those who do not
have a high school diploma, with significant but smaller effects seen on high school diploma
and GED recipients. The effects diminish to an insignificant -0.0015 for those with a college
degree or more. These results, for both age and education, are in line with the expectation
that the minimum wage will reduce job prospects for those with less skill and experience.
A.3 Tables
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Table A.1: Summary statistics for state characteristics and employment outcomes in three administrative data sets
BDS QCEW QWI
Annual, 1977 - 2011 Quarterly, 1975 - 2012 Quarterly, varies - 2012∗
Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median
State minimum wage ($) 4.40 1.360 4.25 4.53 1.535 4.25 5.86 1.094 5.15
State minimum wage ($real) 7.09 0.916 6.89 7.28 0.975 7.05 6.89 0.729 6.85
Employment variables:
Jobs (thousands) 1888.0 2103.8 1224.9 2167.9 2402.9 1441.7 2621.4 2794.2 1763.7
Job growth (thousands) 27.2 85.59 15.4 8.77 65.04 4.28 4.35 74.03 6.15
Job growth (log) 0.017 0.0348 0.019 0.0051 0.0256 0.0049 0.0019 0.0241 0.0061
Job creation (thousands) 314.8 370.4 206.5 573.9 633.3 384.7
Job destruction (thousands) 282.0 337.3 180.1 548.5 613.3 367.3
State annual covariates:
Population (thousands) 5160.6 5725.6 3513.4 5138.0 5704.7 3502.0 6136.5 6784.5 4343.4
Share aged 15-59 0.62 0.0196 0.62 0.62 0.0199 0.62 0.62 0.0145 0.62
GSP/capita ($real) 41,592 16,310 38,447 41,302 16,334 38,148 45,345 8384 43,969
Observations 1785 7752 3029
Notes: We define each state’s minimum wage annually as of March 12 in the BDS, and as of the first date for each quarter in the
QCEW and QWI. We use the maximum of the federal minimum wage and the state’s minimum wage each period, drawn from
state-level sources. Employment statistics are computed for the aggregate population of non-agricultural employees in each state
for each of the three listed data sets. Job growth is the change in each state’s employment level from one time period to the next.
We use job growth and employment outcomes annually for the BDS and quarterly for the QCEW and QWI. The QCEW does not
report gross job creation or destruction. All real dollar amounts are indexed to $2011 using the CPI-Urban. The QWI is a highly
unbalanced panel, beginning with only four states in 1990 and gradually expanding until forty-nine states had joined by 2004. We
include all available state-quarters of the QWI.
Table A.2: Estimated effect of the minimum wage on employment (QCEW): [A] Without trends
Classic Distributed lag Dynamic Break-in-
DiD Levels FD Panel Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log-MW -0.1391*** -0.0270 -0.0070 -0.0075 -0.0096***
(0.0473) (0.0247) (0.0085) (0.0100) (0.0019)
1st lag of log-MW -0.0110 -0.0069 -0.0025
(0.0085) (0.0079) (0.0107)
2nd lag of log-MW -0.0082 -0.0018 0.0031
(0.0080) (0.0071) (0.0108)
3rd lag of log-MW -0.0024 0.0044 -0.0227***
(0.0121) (0.0091) (0.0070)
4th lag of log-MW -0.0124* -0.0097*
(0.0071) (0.0053)
5th lag of log-MW -0.0195** -0.0169**
(0.0074) (0.0072)
6th lag of log-MW -0.0096 -0.0026
(0.0070) (0.0059)
7th lag of log-MW -0.0108 -0.0054
(0.0078) (0.0071)
8th lag of log-MW -0.0103 -0.0063
(0.0063) (0.0054)
9th lag of log-MW -0.0186** -0.0100
(0.0070) (0.0065)
10th lag of log-MW -0.0026 0.0000
(0.0058) (0.0051)
11th lag of log-MW 0.0158 0.0015
(0.0097) (0.0061)
12th lag of log-MW -0.0253*** -0.0119*
(0.0091) (0.0062)
13th lag of log-MW -0.0220** -0.0062
(0.0100) (0.0078)
14th lag of log-MW -0.0145 -0.0050
(0.0087) (0.0070)
15th lag of log-MW -0.0731*** 0.0089
(0.0267) (0.0074)
Sum MW effects -0.2515*** -0.0749**
(0.0656) (0.0344)
1st lag of log-emp. 0.7383***
(0.0608)
Observations 7728 6969 6918 7520 7522
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 Notes: Robust standard errors are
clustered by state and reported in parentheses. Columns/specifications correspond to
those for the BDS in Table 3. See Table 3 notes and the text for additional discussion.
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Table A.3: Estimated effect of the minimum wage on employment (QCEW): [B] With trends
Classic Distributed lag Dynamic Break-in-
DiD Levels FD Panel Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log-MW 0.0010 0.0081 -0.0069 0.0010 -0.0084***
(0.0171) (0.0153) (0.0085) (0.0123) (0.0031)
1st lag of log-MW -0.0047 -0.0069 -0.0037
(0.0092) (0.0080) (0.0098)
2nd lag of log-MW -0.0021 -0.0019 0.0024
(0.0078) (0.0071) (0.0090)
3rd lag of log-MW 0.0071 0.0044 -0.0147*
(0.0097) (0.0091) (0.0085)
4th lag of log-MW -0.0109 -0.0096*
(0.0067) (0.0053)
5th lag of log-MW -0.0137 -0.0168**
(0.0083) (0.0073)
6th lag of log-MW 0.0006 -0.0023
(0.0064) (0.0059)
7th lag of log-MW -0.0073 -0.0051
(0.0068) (0.0071)
8th lag of log-MW -0.0019 -0.0059
(0.0063) (0.0054)
9th lag of log-MW -0.0139* -0.0097
(0.0074) (0.0066)
10th lag of log-MW 0.0007 0.0002
(0.0055) (0.0051)
11th lag of log-MW 0.0016 0.0017
(0.0076) (0.0060)
12th lag of log-MW -0.0040 -0.0116*
(0.0086) (0.0063)
13th lag of log-MW -0.0052 -0.0058
(0.0083) (0.0078)
14th lag of log-MW 0.0000 -0.0044
(0.0078) (0.0069)
15th lag of log-MW 0.0126 0.0095
(0.0122) (0.0073)
Sum MW effects -0.0328 -0.0711*
(0.0398) (0.0357)
1st lag of log-emp. 0.4190***
(0.0682)
Observations 7728 6969 6918 7520 7522
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 Notes: Robust standard errors are
clustered by state and reported in parentheses. Columns/specifications correspond to
those for the BDS in Table 3. See Table 3 notes and the text for additional discussion.
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Table A.4: Estimated effect of the minimum wage on employment (QWI): [A] Without trends
Classic Distributed lag Dynamic Break-in-
DiD Levels FD Panel Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log-MW -0.0447* -0.0018 -0.0007 0.0055 -0.0076***
(0.0231) (0.0205) (0.0141) (0.0144) (0.0024)
1st lag of log-MW -0.0128 -0.0065 -0.0117
(0.0110) (0.0103) (0.0178)
2nd lag of log-MW -0.0103 -0.0196 -0.0074
(0.0134) (0.0121) (0.0120)
3rd lag of log-MW 0.0130 0.0072 -0.0078
(0.0124) (0.0122) (0.0158)
4th lag of log-MW 0.0080 -0.0009
(0.0107) (0.0083)
5th lag of log-MW -0.0090 -0.0184*
(0.0110) (0.0098)
6th lag of log-MW -0.0072 -0.0097
(0.0112) (0.0108)
7th lag of log-MW -0.0060 -0.0069
(0.0138) (0.0131)
8th lag of log-MW 0.0044 -0.0010
(0.0126) (0.0103)
9th lag of log-MW -0.0237** -0.0162
(0.0107) (0.0097)
10th lag of log-MW -0.0056 -0.0014
(0.0095) (0.0078)
11th lag of log-MW 0.0062 0.0028
(0.0104) (0.0086)
12th lag of log-MW 0.0053 -0.0065
(0.0112) (0.0098)
13th lag of log-MW -0.0085 -0.0097
(0.0113) (0.0111)
14th lag of log-MW -0.0128 -0.0106
(0.0100) (0.0090)
15th lag of log-MW -0.0014 -0.0043
(0.0192) (0.0120)
Sum MW effects -0.0623 -0.1024**
(0.0458) (0.0391)
1st lag of log-emp. 0.5927***
(0.0720)
Observations 3029 2294 2245 2833 2833
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 Notes: Robust standard errors are
clustered by state and reported in parentheses. Columns/specifications correspond to
those for the BDS in Table 3. See Table 3 notes and the text for additional discussion.
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Table A.5: Estimated effect of the minimum wage on employment (QWI): [B] With trends
Classic Distributed lag Dynamic Break-in-
DiD Levels FD Panel Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log-MW -0.0071 0.0132 -0.0018 0.0124 -0.0099**
(0.0147) (0.0183) (0.0137) (0.0145) (0.0047)
1st lag of log-MW -0.0121 -0.0081 -0.0122
(0.0112) (0.0109) (0.0158)
2nd lag of log-MW -0.0129 -0.0211 -0.0091
(0.0125) (0.0128) (0.0116)
3rd lag of log-MW 0.0158 0.0054 -0.0030
(0.0127) (0.0119) (0.0170)
4th lag of log-MW 0.0075 -0.0024
(0.0099) (0.0080)
5th lag of log-MW -0.0133 -0.0185*
(0.0095) (0.0096)
6th lag of log-MW -0.0052 -0.0098
(0.0112) (0.0101)
7th lag of log-MW -0.0038 -0.0071
(0.0141) (0.0143)
8th lag of log-MW 0.0063 -0.0010
(0.0098) (0.0106)
9th lag of log-MW -0.0179* -0.0165
(0.0096) (0.0101)
10th lag of log-MW -0.0011 -0.0014
(0.0086) (0.0080)
11th lag of log-MW 0.0085 0.0029
(0.0096) (0.0091)
12th lag of log-MW 0.0034 -0.0062
(0.0106) (0.0098)
13th lag of log-MW -0.0107 -0.0096
(0.0111) (0.0115)
14th lag of log-MW -0.0076 -0.0101
(0.0099) (0.0096)
15th lag of log-MW 0.0089 -0.0027
(0.0144) (0.0127)
Sum MW effects -0.0210 -0.1080**
(0.0399) (0.0438)
1st lag of log-emp. 0.3940***
(0.0581)
Observations 3029 2294 2245 2833 2833
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 Notes: Robust standard errors are
clustered by state and reported in parentheses. Columns/specifications correspond to
those for the BDS in Table 3. See Table 3 notes and the text for additional discussion.
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Table A.6: Robustness checks for the distributed lag first-differences model (QCEW and QWI)
Baseline Leading values tests Division Inflation Pre-2008
results t+ 1 t+ 2 Both time FE indexing only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
[A] QCEW
Sum MW effects -0.0749** -0.0700* -0.0750** -0.0659* -0.0551 -0.0559* -0.0700*
(0.0344) (0.0368) (0.0358) (0.0367) (0.0342) (0.0331) (0.0355)
1st lead of log-MW 0.0143 0.0152
(0.010) (0.010)
2nd lead of log-MW 0.0069 0.0085
(0.006) (0.006)
Observations 6918 6867 6816 6816 6918 6698 5898
[B] QWI
Sum MW effects -0.1024** -0.0956** -0.1106*** -0.1010** -0.0765** -0.0695* -0.1180**
(0.0391) (0.0371) (0.0382) (0.0393) (0.0361) (0.0354) (0.0490)
1st lead of log-MW 0.0160 0.0148
(0.013) (0.012)
2nd lead of log-MW -0.0074 -0.0060
(0.011) (0.011)
Observations 2245 2196 2147 2147 2245 2026 1366
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 Notes: Column (1) replicates Specification (3) without trends from
Tables A.2 and A.4. Separately: Columns (2) - (4) include, respectively, the leading value of the log minimum
wage at time t+1 or t+2, or both. Column (5) uses Division-by-time fixed effects, rather than Region-by-time.
Column (6) drops the observations with an inflation-indexed state minimum wage, and Column (7) uses only
pre-2008 data.
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Table A.7: Robustness checks for the break-in-trend model (QCEW and QWI)
Baseline Leading values tests Division Inflation Pre-2008
results Indicator t+ 2 t+ 3 time FE indexing only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
[A] QCEW
Log-MW -0.0096*** -0.0097*** -0.0211*** -0.0137*** -0.0107*** -0.0097*** -0.0086***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
I(∆MWt+1) 0.0022
(0.002)
2nd lead of log-MW 0.0123*
(0.007)
3rd lead of log-MW 0.0047
(0.003)
Observations 7522 7471 7420 7369 7522 7302 6502
[B] QWI
Log-MW -0.0076*** -0.0061** -0.0101 -0.0068 -0.0078** -0.0064*** -0.0059***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
I(∆MWt+1) 0.0044*
(0.003)
2nd lead of log-MW 0.0029
(0.007)
3rd lead of log-MW -0.0018
(0.005)
Observations 2833 2784 2735 2686 2833 2613 1953
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 Notes: Column (1) replicates Specification (5) without trends from
Tables A.3 and A.5. Separately: Column (2) adds an indicator equal to one if the nominal minimum wage increases in the
following period. Columns (3) - (4) include, respectively, the leading value of the log minimum wage at time t+2 or t+3.
Column (5) uses Division-by-time fixed effects, rather than Region-by-time. Column (6) drops the observations with an
inflation-indexed state minimum wage, and Column (7) uses only pre-2008 data only.
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Table A.8: Effect of the minimum wage by industry (Break-in-Trend model)
QCEW QWI
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Industry All: full QCEW (1975-2012) -0.0084*** (0.0031)
(NAICS) All: NAICS available (1990-) -0.0085** (0.0038) -0.0099** (0.0047)
11: Agriculture and wildlife -0.0024 (0.0179) 0.0092 (0.0254)
21: Mining -0.0392 (0.0257) 0.0028 (0.0211)
22: Utilities -0.0051 (0.0167) -0.0094 (0.0154)
23: Construction -0.0237* (0.0132) -0.0314* (0.0175)
31-33: Manufacturing 0.0021 (0.0105) 0.0011 (0.0096)
42: Wholesale trade -0.0039 (0.0042) -0.0108 (0.0067)
44-45: Retail trade -0.0061 (0.0042) -0.0126** (0.0054)
48-49: Transportation and warehouse -0.0213* (0.0120) -0.0037 (0.0058)
51: Information service -0.0065 (0.0143) 0.0024 (0.0095)
52: Finance and insurance -0.0033 (0.0048) -0.0052 (0.0085)
53: Real estate -0.0073 (0.0050) -0.0060 (0.0070)
54: Professional service -0.0157*** (0.0049) -0.0324*** (0.0106)
55: Management -0.0566** (0.0243) -0.0359 (0.0586)
56: Administrative support -0.0197** (0.0085) -0.0203* (0.0108)
61: Education related 0.0345 (0.0238) 0.0173 (0.0151)
62: Health care 0.0004 (0.0025) -0.0007 (0.0045)
71: Arts and entertainment -0.0350* (0.0178) -0.0314 (0.0188)
72: Accommodation and food -0.0140** (0.0069) -0.0215** (0.0088)
81: Other service -0.0453 (0.0299) -0.0080 (0.0074)
92: Public administration -0.0083 (0.0078) -0.0128 (0.0115)
Observations 4437 2833
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 Notes: Each coefficient represents a separate regression of the first
difference in employment for that industry on the natural log of a state’s real minimum wage, using Specification
5 with trends from Table A.3. Robust standard errors are clustered by state and reported in parentheses. The
QCEW provides consistent (NAICS) industry codes beginning in 1990.
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Table A.9: Effect of the minimum wage by age group (Break-in-Trend model)
QWI
Coef. Std. Err.
All: 14-99 -0.0099** (0.0047)
14-18 -0.0459*** (0.0163)
19-21 -0.0223* (0.0124)
22-24 -0.0156** (0.0068)
25-34 -0.0102** (0.0048)
35-44 -0.0031 (0.0046)
45-54 -0.0028 (0.0039)
55-64 -0.0039 (0.0035)
65-99 -0.0084 (0.0060)
Observations 4437
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 Notes:
Each coefficient represents a separate regression of the
first difference in employment for that age group on
the natural log of a state’s real minimum wage, using
Specification 5 with trends from Table A.5. Robust
standard errors are clustered by state and reported in
parentheses.
Table A.10: Effect of the minimum wage by education level (Break-in-Trend model)
QWI
Coef. Std. Err.
All education levels -0.0053 (0.0041)
Less than high school -0.0100* (0.0058)
High school or equivalent -0.0073* (0.0042)
Some college or associates -0.0056 (0.0038)
Bachelors or higher degree -0.0015 (0.0043)
Observations 4437
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 Notes:
Each coefficient represents a separate regression of the
first difference in employment for that education level
(for adults aged 25 or older) on the natural log of a
state’s real minimum wage, using Specification 5 with
trends from Table A.5. Robust standard errors are
clustered by state and reported in parentheses.
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B Robustness of Estimates to Time Period Included
Figure B.1: Distribution of point estimates from subsamples of time-spans in the BDS
Figure B.2: Distribution of point estimates from subsamples of time-spans in the QCEW
47
C Historical Minimum Wage Increases and Erosion
Historically, minimum wages have been set in nominal dollars and not adjusted for inflation,
so any nominal wage differential between two jurisdictions will become economically less
meaningful over time. This appendix section presents some figures depicting the frequency
and magnitude of minimum wage changes – and their subsequent erosion due to inflation.
Looking first only within-state, Figure C.6 shows that the mean real state minimum wage
increase during 1976-2012 was 55 cents (the median was also 55 cents). By the time the
same state next increased its real minimum wage, which took 54 months on average, the
previous increase in minimum wage had eroded – via inflation – to an average cumulative
real decrease of 11 cents (median -12 cents, see Figure C.7). In fact, Figure C.8 shows that
the 62 percent of state-year real minimum wage increases that were eventually fully eroded
by inflation did so in, on average, twenty-two months, and the median time elapsed was only
sixteen months. Turning instead to comparisons within Census Region, the mean relative
real increase in state minimum wage was 25 cents (median 13 cents, Figure C.9). By the
time of the next within-state increase, the prior increase had eroded – both via inflation and
from other regional neighbors changing their minimum wages – to an average decrease of 1
cents (median +2 cents, Figure C.10). For those 47 percent of state-year increases which
fully eroded relative to regional states, this took only 17 months on average (median 12
months, Figure C.11). This exercise demonstrates that there is a relatively short duration of
time during which a state difference-in-differences estimation can identify the effects of the
minimum wage on employment levels.
Figure C.3: Comparison of federal to state nominal minimum wages (January, 1975-2012)
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Figure C.4: Comparison of federal to state real minimum wages (January, 1975-2012))
Figure C.5: Standard deviation of residual state real minimum wages (1975-2012)
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Figure C.6: Distribution of real minimum wage increases
Figure C.7: Cumulative difference in real minimum wage prior to a new increase
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Figure C.8: Erosion of real increases in minimum wage
Figure C.9: Distribution of relative minimum wage increases
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Figure C.10: Cumulative difference in relative minimum wage prior to a new increase
Figure C.11: Erosion of relative increases in minimum wage
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